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Abstract
Purpose - The standard forms of construction contract are receiving greater attention in the
management of projects scholarship as they probably influence the project success and project
disputes. The extant literature suggests that the standard forms of construction contract are one of the
top sources of disputes. This research, therefore, examines the effectiveness of the standard forms of
construction contract, FIDIC and NEC, in reducing disputes in the Palestinian construction industry.
 
 Design/methodology/approach - The researchers have used qualitative methods to collect
data and more specifically have undertaken twelve semi-structured interviews.
Findings - The study reveals that the standard forms of construction contract can be a tool to
minimise disputes, but certainly not to eradicate them, and NEC appears to be more capable than
FIDIC to do so.
 
Originality/value - This study contributes to knowledge by bringing an industrial perspective
into the role of standard forms of contract in disputes creation and avoidance. The
interviewees, recurrent users of FIDIC contract, criticised certain features and expressions
and proposed some solutions
 
Keywords: FIDIC; NEC; New Engineering Contract; Engineering and Construction
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1. Introduction ​
 
Construction disputes is an important area for academics trying to understand why
construction contracts go wrong. Constructions disputes are problematic, unpleasant, and
dysfunctional, destroy client-supplier business relationship, costly, and may lead to cost/time
overrun (Fenn, 2011). The literature includes a growing body of scientific research
investigating the role of contracts in dispute materialisation. For instance, Clegg (1992)
proposed that, from a sociologist view, contracts cause conflict.  Cheung and Pang (2012)
argue that contracts are the root cause of all types of construction disputes. Specifically, Fenn
et al. (1997) argue that one of the top factors creating disputes in the construction industry is
standard form of construction contract. They empirically compared a wide range of standard
forms of construction contract and concluded that certain contracts may cause more disputes
than others.   However, it is unknown how standard forms of contracts may contribute
differently to the formation and evolution of disputes. Therefore, this research theoretically
and empirically examine this notion by comparing the effectiveness of FIDIC and NEC
standard forms of construction contract in minimising disputes.
The choice of FIDIC and NEC contracts in this research is based on three-folds. First, the
fundamental aim behind drafting and bringing NEC into life is to resolve the problem of
disputes arising and the adversarial behaviour in construction. Indeed, the Palestinian
construction industry suffers from the adversarial relationships between construction parties
and the increasing level of disputes (Enshassi et al., 2009). Second, infrastructure and
construction projects are implemented by the government or by foreign or international
employers. The government uses FIDIC 1999 conditions of contract and many foreign or
international employers or organisations financing construction projects use FIDIC such as
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Bank for Development, the
European Commission and different United Nations bodies (Aljarosha, 2008; Swiney, 2007;
Zhanglin and Yuli, 2010). Yet, some of these organisations are testing the potential usage of
NEC instead of FIDIC in their projects. For instance, the Asian Development Bank and the
UK‘s Overseas Development Agency are testing replacing FIDIC by NEC for their
sponsored projects (Ndekugri and Mcdonnell, 1999). Third, FIDIC is the most widely used
Zhanglin and Yuli, 2010). Yet, some of these organisations are testing the potential usage of
NEC instead of FIDIC in their projects. For instance, the Asian Development Bank and the
UK‘s Overseas Development Agency are testing replacing FIDIC by NEC for their
sponsored projects (Ndekugri and Mcdonnell, 1999). Third, FIDIC is the most widely used
international form of construction contract in the world (Seifert, 2005). At the same time, the
usage of NEC in the UK and 30 other countries in the world is an indicator of its increasing
popularity worldwide (Thompson et al., 2000). This means the research findings may be
transferable to many jurisdictions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, five aspects of FIDIC conditions
of contract are compared and contrasted with those of NEC. This is followed by brief
explanations of the conceptual framework and the interviews which were carried out with
twelve professionals working in the Palestinian construction industry. The views and
opinions of the interviewees with regards to the effectiveness of FIDIC and NEC in reducing
disputes in the Palestinian construction industry are then discussed prior to the presentation of
the conclusion.
2. FIDIC Compared and Contrasted with NEC
This comparison is neither clause-to-clause nor is it claimed to be exhaustive and
encyclopaedic. A comprehensive and holistic comparison between FIDIC suite of contracts
and NEC suite of contracts is very ambitious and board aim because there are many contracts
in each family. Therefore, the scope of this study is limited to FIDIC 99 Red Book vs. ECC3
(NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract). Further, the study concentrates on the five
most important aspects that normally give rise to construction disputes in Palestine, as the
available literature suggests. These include disputes arising from misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of contract conditions written in English, and onerous terms (i.e. unfair risk
allocation) (Enshassi et al., 2009; Murtaja; 2007; Enshassi, 1999), variation orders
(Abedmousa, 2008), the lack of trust between contractors and engineers (Saqfelhait, 2012)
that creates an adversarial environment in which one of the most important factors
determining bid-no-bid and mark up decisions are "project engineer" (Enshassi et al., 2010)
in addition to the endemic volatile and unstable political environment (e.g. as borders’
closures, blockade, and hostilities) that leads to cost and time overruns (El-Sawalhi and El-
Riyati, 2015, Enshassi et al., 2009).
 
2.1 Clarity and Simplicity
Chong and Zin (2009) argue that one of the main causes of disputes is misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of contract clauses and the preventive solution lies in the use of plain
English. Clarity is important to ensure that all parties of a contract understand what they are
getting themselves into, their rights and obligations, and the risk apportionment and thus what
risks they bear.
FIDIC has been criticised for using obscure, complicated, inscrutable and legal language that
has phrases traced back to contracts of the19th century in England (Broom and Hayes, 1997).
In addition, FIDIC's poor layout, long sentences and substantial cross-referencing makes it
difficult to understand (Cutts and Maher, 1986; and Wydick, 1978). Nevertheless, it is
important while reviewing these critiques to consider their time context, as they were written
prior to or just after the release of FIDIC 1987. It worth mentioning that one of the objectives
behind drafting the FIDIC 1999 Rainbow edition was to simplify the language. However, it is
uncertain whether FIDIC has been completely successful in this aim. Probably, FIDIC has
been improved much from its earlier editions and has moved towards fewer clauses and
clearer language and contract structure, but the real judgment is left to its users. Indeed, this
area is a worthwhile investigation for further research.
NEC is different from FIDIC as one of its three declared objectives is to minimise the
incidences of disputes arising from unclear language. NEC uses non-legalistic ordinary
unequivocal language, straightforward, simple and plain English, short sentences (with no
more than 40 words), a bulleted structure and avoidance of confusing cross-references. Also,
there are guidance notes and flow charts to assist in the understanding of how to create and
operate the contract (Eggleston, 2006; Gould, 2007; Li, 2006). The abandoning of "legal
language" is a revolutionary step by the NEC drafters which is much debated. The drafters
claim that they sacrificed legal concepts in the interests of better management of projects.
This makes the language more understandable to builders at site level (Lavin and Potts, 1998;
Li, 2006). Moreover, it saves time and money paid to lawyers to translate the contract to legal
phrases, and then translate it back to users so they know what it means (Abrahamson, 1979).
On the other hand, the main criticism of this approach is that it discards the accumulated
contractual wisdom of generations, reinvents the wheel and reduces the legal certainty which
could increase the chance of contractual disputes (Eggleston, 2006; Valentine, 1996).
To sum up, the research acknowledges that NEC is not perfect, but it is a considerable
contractual wisdom of generations, reinvents the wheel and reduces the legal certainty which
could increase the chance of contractual disputes (Eggleston, 2006; Valentine, 1996).
To sum up, the research acknowledges that NEC is not perfect, but it is a considerable
improvement in clarity compared to FIDIC. Indeed, what is required to avoid disputes
is clear English, and certainly not a long history of case law and judicial precedents on a
particular clause or phraseology. To avoid disputes in the first place, people at site level
should be able to understand the conditions, and not need to memorise a dozen cases
about particular clauses.
2.1 Risk Allocation and Management
It is inherent for any project, particularly in the construction industry, to involve risks. It is
not possible to eliminate all risks, but what can be done is to allocate the risks to the various
parties who then manage them (Kozek and Hebberd, 1998). The standard forms of conditions
of contract provide a framework to regulate the process of risk allocation by defining the
rights and obligations of both parties.
Both FIDIC and NEC attempt to allocate risks fairly and reasonably between the employer
and the contractor (Ndekugri and Mcdonnell, 1999). The basic principle to achieve this is by
allocating the risk to the party best able to control and manage the risk event and bear the risk
consequences (Bunni, 2005; Eggleston, 2006; Potts, 2008; Williams, 2001).
FIDIC is based on the principle of balanced risk sharing and has been widely accepted by
employers and contractors as a reasonable compromise (Bunni, 2005; Osinski, 2002). The
employer bears only the risk of unforeseen negative conditions that are not offset by
unforeseen positive conditions. This means there is less chance for contractors to get time
extensions and cost compensation for unforeseen events since they have to be unforeseen,
and if they are, they need to be offset by other favourable conditions. At first glance, FIDIC's
new philosophy of "conditions-balancing" seems fair, equitable, and desirable and similar to
pain/gain of partnering arrangements. However, it potentially increases disputes because it
provides the parties with more things to argue about, which could be costly and impossible to
settle (Swiney, 2007).
Unlike FIDIC, NEC recognises that the standard form should not only be a mechanism for
risk allocation, but also for a proactive and dynamic risk management. NEC acknowledges
that an important part of risk management is effective communication between the parties.
This includes risk registers, risk prevention, early warning and risk reduction meetings
(Wassenaer, 2009).
The controversy and comparison between NEC and FIDIC regarding this area hinges on two
views on the purpose of a standard form of construction contract. Should the standard form
be a manual for project management procedures and practices or an agenda for legal actions?
FIDIC tends to be skewed towards the latter narrow view of a contract, as it is principally
designed to focus more on the risks, liabilities, obligations and responsibilities of the parties
(Heaphy, 2011). Therefore, the parties will use the contract when things go wrong or disputes
surface in an attempt to find a clause that will support their contractual position or justify a
claim or to allocate blame (Brown, 2000; Eggleston, 2006). NEC is radically different from
FIDIC in that it focuses on informed, proactive and foresight-based management and
decision-making, rather than a reactive and hindsight-based negative approach.
Collaboratively applied foresight mitigates problems, shrinks risks and adversarial behaviour,
and removes most of the grounds for dispute (Lavin and Potts, 1998). However, focusing on
the management side at the expense of the legalistic and contractual side could produce an
"obligationally incomplete" contract (Eggleston, 2006; Hughes and Maeda, 2002).
Apparently, NEC has been more successful than FIDIC in expanding standard forms' role
towards risks. NEC manages risks proactively and dynamically, and, unlike FIDIC, is not
only concerned about risk allocation.
 
 
2.2 Force Majeure and Prevention Events
Force majeure events are of a great importance, particularly under the unstable conditions in
Palestine. The legal definition and interpretation of the events may vary from country to country, and
from one jurisdiction to another, which will accordingly lead to different legal consequences.
Therefore, most standard forms, including FIDIC and NEC, cover these matters by express terms
(Eggleston, 2006; Jaeger and Hök, 2010). FIDIC clause 19.1, defines force majeure events to be:
• beyond a party's control,
• could not reasonably be provided against before entering into the contract,
• having arisen, could not reasonably be avoided or overcome, and
• are not substantially attributable to the other party.
Indeed, clause 19.1 provides a non-exhaustive list, including events such as war, terrorism,
• having arisen, could not reasonably be avoided or overcome, and
• are not substantially attributable to the other party.
Indeed, clause 19.1 provides a non-exhaustive list, including events such as war, terrorism,
riots, and natural disasters. The above definition of a force majeure event is entirely open-
ended, such that a human-caused event would be covered if it met the above criteria. This
gives more risk to the employer as he bears the cost and time impacts (Swiney, 2007). Jaeger
and Hök (2010) criticise the ambiguity of the extent of the contractor's entitlement to an
extension of time, and loss and expense, as to whether it covers direct and indirect
consequences of the event. It is worth mentioning that a force majeure event does not need to
pass the "unforeseeability" test. This means even if an event is foreseeable, it will be
considered force majeure as long as it is beyond the control of the parties (Jaeger and Hök,
2010).
 
NEC 3 has introduced a new clause (clause 19.1) called "prevention" under which the employer bears
the time and cost risks of events similar to, but potentially wider than, force majeure. Clause 19.1
defines a prevention event as an event which:
• stops the contractor completing the works, or
• stops the contractor completing the works by the date shown on the accepted programme, and
• neither party could prevent, and
• an experienced contractor would have judged at the contract date to have had such a small
chance of occurring that it would have been unreasonable to have allowed for it
 
Eggleston (2006) criticises this clause as it opens the door for a very wide interpretation
because its definition goes well beyond what is adopted in law as "force majeure". For
instance, a contractor may argue that insolvency of suppliers or the supply of defective
materials, works and designs by others had a small chance of occurring and could not have
been prevented by either party. He also critiques the words "small chance" and
"unreasonable" which are difficult tests to examine in dispute resolution proceedings, and
would indicate the event to be one of "prevention" even though it was foreseeable, the same
as FIDIC. Furthermore, the "prevention" clause seems to apply to delay events which are
endemic and it does not make sense that the clause operates for each and every delaying
event (Eggleston, 2006).
To sum up, both FIDIC and NEC share the same philosophy of transferring the risk of force
majeure events to the employer to avoid padding the tender prices by contractors. It appears
that both FIDIC and NEC fail to provide a decisive and conclusive definition of what
constitutes a force majeure or prevention situation. The problem with the force majeure
definition is that people do not know what might happen so they always struggle to define it.
This could cause disputes as a notice of force majeure would be rejected by the defendant
denying the existence of this event, and in turn suing the claimant or plaintiff for a breach of
contract. Bunni (2005) states that not covering these exceptional events in the conditions of
contract, and leaving them to the applicable law in the relevant jurisdiction would reduce the
likelihood of conflicts. However, not covering them at all will make the resort to litigation
inevitable, which is not desirable.
2.3 Variations
According to Seppala (1991), the inevitable variations are the second major area giving rise
to claims under FIDIC. FIDIC is unable to cope with significant variations because it is
essentially a re-measurement contract that assumes the project scope is well defined prior to
letting the tender documents. FIDIC Sub-clause 12.3 limits variations of items to 10% by
quantity and other criteria which necessitate new rates to be agreed (FIDIC, 1999). The
process of determination of the new rates, whereby a contractor submits a proposal and then
the engineer determines suitable prices, is a rigorous and tough process that inevitably will
lead to disagreement and dispute.
FIDIC details that a change is to be valued at the same or by considering rates and prices set
out in the contract, or the engineer agrees new suitable rates and prices through the procedure
of "due consultation" with the employer and the contractor. If no agreement is reached, the
last resort is determining the appropriate prices by the engineer. This procedure assumes that
the value will be calculated after the variation or change has been carried out (FIDIC, 1999;
Forward, 2002).
On another hand, FIDIC introduces a new innovation allowing contractors to initiate
variations under a "Value Engineering" clause. The contractor may submit a proposal, which
needs the approval of the engineer to proceed, to increase efficiency, reduce cost and time etc.
to the benefit of the employer (FIDIC, 1999). Obviously, this feature encourages
On another hand, FIDIC introduces a new innovation allowing contractors to initiate
variations under a "Value Engineering" clause. The contractor may submit a proposal, which
needs the approval of the engineer to proceed, to increase efficiency, reduce cost and time etc.
to the benefit of the employer (FIDIC, 1999). Obviously, this feature encourages
collaboration and partnering, and it should have been introduced within NEC.
Normally, standard forms make it clear via express terms that the contractor is obliged to
perform variations. NEC does not recognise the phrase "variations" or "changes", but
addresses them indirectly through Clause 14.3 (Instructions) which serves as the variation
clause (Eggleston, 2006). Although there is no explicit limit to changes, Clause 12.3 tends to
limit them by stating that no change to the contract has effect unless it is provided for in the
conditions of contract or unless it has been agreed, confirmed in writing, and signed by the
parties (Eggleston, 2006).
NEC provides for pre-pricing a variation/change before it is carried out. This means that the
instruction - variation order or change order - by the client will at first be an instruction to
submit a price (quotation) for the work, which, if accepted, will be followed by an instruction
to carry out the work (Eggleston, 2006). This is beneficial for both parties. The client can
decide whether to go ahead or not based on the price. The contractor ensures the price of the
work is accepted and thus avoids disputes. Yet, the drawback of the NEC system could be a
delay in reaching an agreement on the price, and in turn a delay to the project activities.
In summary, FIDIC tries to avoid disputes by minimising variations to a certain limit after
which a new process should be agreed. However, the process of price determination is still
problematic. On the other hand, NEC is very flexible as it does not limit variations, but it
requires pre-pricing and quotations that fix the prices before commencing the variation.
Overall, it is obvious that both use different approaches to tackle the same problem, but NEC
tends to be more successful, as what really does matter, at the end of the day, is price
agreement and not the 10% limit on quantity or some other constraint.
2.4 The role of the Engineer versus the Project Manager
The aim of this section is to critically examine and compare the role of the engineer under
FIDIC with the project manager under NEC.
Under the FIDIC's old Red Book, the engineer has two main duties. Firstly, he is the
employer's agent for design, supervision of the works’ construction and execution, and
contract administration. Secondly, he is a neutral and independent third party responsible to
decide and determine the contractor's claims for additional payment or extensions of time,
and to resolve disputes fairly between the contractor and the employer (Seppala, 1991).
The employer is responsible for the engineer's default in the first group of duties and in turn
may be in breach of contract, but he is not responsible for the engineer's performance in
respect of the second group of duties, except in the case of total failure to perform these
duties. The duality of role of the engineer as the employer‘s agent and a neutral third party is
much criticised because of the conflict of interests in his duties. For example, the engineer
may be the cause of problems like design errors and delay in making decisions. Moreover, he
is appointed and paid by the employer and may seek future work with him, or at least avoid
being sacked (Ndekugri et al., 2007; Seppala, 1991).
NEC resolves these problems, or tries to resolve it, by splitting the engineer’s role into four
entities; the project manager, supervisor, designer, and adjudicator. All these roles are agents
of the employer except the adjudicator. The project manager is required to make the plans,
administer the contract, certify and value payments etc with a main mission to get the project
delivered on time and within budget. The supervisor is concerned with the quality of works
and defects. Those two roles can be combined and occupied by one person (Eggleston, 2006).
It is important to keep in mind that the new roles of the engineer under NEC, compared to
other forms, would encourage engineers not to recommend such a standard form that
considerably reduces their own authority and workload (Lavin and Potts, 1998).
The project manager is the representative of the employer and works on his behalf. There is
no express requirement on NEC provisions obligating the project manager to be impartial.
However, some routine tasks and activities such as issuing certificates, and valuing
compensation events seem to require impartiality and fairness. As a certifier and valuer, the
project manager shall not work to secure the employer's interests. This was emphasised in the
unusual case of Costain Ltd and Others v. Bechtel Ltd (2005), in which the judge made the
decision that the project manager's duty is to act fairly and impartially when acting as a
certifier (Eggleston, 2006). This case shows that the role separation is not as simple as
appears on the face of it.
Under the new Red Book, there is an attempt to abandon the "independent engineer" concept.
This appears from three changes: removing the requirement to "act impartially", expressly
stating that the engineer is to act as the employer's agent, and introducing the Dispute
Adjudication Board (DAB) to which the parties may refer any dispute. It is important to view
Under the new Red Book, there is an attempt to abandon the "independent engineer" concept.
This appears from three changes: removing the requirement to "act impartially", expressly
stating that the engineer is to act as the employer's agent, and introducing the Dispute
Adjudication Board (DAB) to which the parties may refer any dispute. It is important to view
the development and changes of the contract holistically. The non-neutral engineer and DAB
are closely related and have been introduced as one package (Swiney, 2007). Certainly, this
has significantly reduced the dispute resolution role and power of the engineer (Ndekugri et
al., 2007).
The total abandonment of the "independent Engineer" concept is questioned since it replaces
the duty to "act impartially" by the duty to make "fair determinations" of the claims between
the employer and the contractor, which appears to reinstate the old concept. However, a new
mechanism to allow the employer to regain control over the engineer is introduced in clause
3.1. This is achieved by stating that the engineer is to act as the employer's agent in the
Particular Conditions. Furthermore, unlike the old Red Book, the new Book empowers the
employer with express authority to replace the engineer for any reason whatsoever, subject to
two procedural requirements (Ndekugri et al., 2007).
Lina (1997) argues that although the dual role of the engineer should be abandoned, the new
FIDIC and NEC approaches are less efficient than the traditional system. For instance, the
NEC approach of separating the duties of the engineer to multiple people or firms ignores the
consistency gained by one party working over the whole project life cycle from project
inception to completion. Also, the engineer's knowledge of the project's day-to-day activities
enables him to make decisions better than the DAB or adjudicator. In addition, the
interference of the DAB or adjudicator may create a confrontational rather than a cooperative
environment and in turn increase claims, especially as the engineer no longer has an
obligation to act impartially. Finally, the additional fees payable to the DAB or adjudicator
make the works more expensive (Lina, 1997).
Summarising, the new Red Book has moved towards the NEC approach to dispose of the
independent engineer concept. However, FIDIC has not gone all the way because the duality
of engineer's role has not been eliminated completely. Arguably, this is favourable as the new
Red Book is structured flexibly enough to serve the requirements of different parties
(Ndekugri et al., 2007).
3. Conceptual Framework
This research is of a qualitative nature because it aims to induce the relationship between the
choice of a standard contract and contractual disputes. The research method depends on
reviewing the literature and conducting interviews.
The variables or units of analysis in the theoretical framework of this research are the FIDIC
and NEC standard contracts and construction disputes. The main assumption here of the
interaction between the variables is that the choice of the contract has a direct effect on the
disputes between construction parties. In other words, the contract is the independent variable
whereas the dispute is the dependent variable. The proposition here is that NEC may
minimise disputes. The validity of this proposition will be investigated by surveying the
opinions of practitioners through interviews.
4. Interviews
The interview questions were built with the proposition that knowledge about FIDIC is
expected, but no prior knowledge about NEC is assumed. The interviews were conducted via
Skype, which gives almost the same atmosphere of a face-to-face personal interview because
of the inclusion of video communication. The average interview duration was 85 minutes.
Selected "expert" sampling has been followed in this research. This involves selecting people
who have expertise in the research topic, which is in this case is construction contracts,
especially FIDIC.
The data is obtained from twelve semi-structured interviews with eminent professionals in
the Palestinian construction industry. The interviewees fall under the following job titles or
positions: project manager, technical manager, executive manager, procurement/ contract
manager, programme manager, academic and arbitrator. The interviewees have been selected
with the intention in mind to be as diverse as possible. Therefore, it is very likely to obtain
diverse and various opinions and experiences that may disagree on many issues. This should
be viewed as a healthy debate giving rise to more rounded conclusions, and covering the
topic in a holistic view from many angles. The interviewees represent the
client/owner/employer organisation, the contractor company, engineering and consulting
firms, and development agencies. In addition, the researchers have interviewed people of
different genders, different ages and experiences. The range of experience ranges from 8
years to 30 years.
5. Results and discussions
 
different genders, different ages and experiences. The range of experience ranges from 8
years to 30 years.
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4.1 Clarity and Simplicity
The respondents were asked to describe the clarity, readability, understanding, interpretation and
certainty of meaning of FIDIC clauses.
 
There was a clear disagreement regarding the degree of clarity, but all respondents argued that FIDIC
is not clear enough. The interviewees maintain that FIDIC's extensive cross-referencing and many
very long sentences, separated by commas reduce the readability and the understanding.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further they think the lack of clarity, or the difficulty in understanding, which either lead to various
interpretations of the contract comes from the fact that almost all of its users are engineers not
schooled in law, while the contract was drafted by lawyers using very legalistic language. Further, the
fact that the contract users	  are non-native English speaking brings more difficulties as to the need to
understand the ordinary meaning of the words/phrases and the legal meaning that usually is built on a
legal tradition of long case law particular to the country of origin.	   They think the use of Arabic
version is very useful especially for first-time users; however, it is not a panacea. This is mainly
because of the potential problem of deviation or distortion of the meaning when translating legal
terms and phrases to other languages, particularly if this is combined with different legal systems. It
seems that the simple and plain English of NEC helps to reduce disagreements and disputes resulting
from the FIDIC's legal and obscure wordings. Also, the translation of NEC to Arabic would be much
easier and clearer than FIDIC because of its ordinary language.
 
Also, they state that FIDIC uses phrases which are uncertain in meaning and could have more than
one interpretation such as "in the contractor opinion", “unforeseeable”, “exceptional”, “experienced
contractor”, “physical conditions”.
 In	   the	   allocation	   of	   ground	   conditions	   risk,	   FIDIC	   uses	   a	   “foreseeability”	   test(“unforeseeable	   for	   an	   experienced	   contractor”)	   whereas	   NEC	   uses	   a	   “probability”	   test(“have	  a	  small	  chance	  of	  occurring”).	  Although	  some	  authors	  criticise	  both	  expressionsas	   being	   uncertain	   and	   slightly	   different	   approaches	   (Eggleston,	   2006;	   Ndekugri	   andMcdonnell,	  1999),	  FIDIC's	  foreseeability	  test	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  problematic	  because	  itis	  undertaken	  only	  after	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  event	  i.e.	  the	  test	  calls	  for	  an	  assessment
ex	  ante.	  Psychologically,	   it	   is	   next	   to	   impossible	   to	   ignore	   this	   ex-­‐post	   knowledge	   andtherefore	  this	  retrospective	  investigation	  to determine what was foreseeable and what wasnot	   suffers	   from	   the	   notorious	   “hindsight	   bias”	   (perceiving	   past	   events	   to	   have	   beenmore	  predictable	  than	  they	  actually	  were).	  Almost	  all	  the	  interviewees	  expressed	  theirdiscomfort	   with	   this	   test.	   Some	   interviewees	   stated	   that	   the	   ‘foreseeability’	   test	   isdefective	   and	   judgements	   on	   the	   foreseeability	   of	   events	   are	   unpredictable,	   a	   puregamble	   or	   a	   speculative	   exercise.	   Another	   interviewee	   criticised	   the	   essence	   of	   howFIDIC	  treats	  the	  concept	  of	  foreseeability	  as	  a	  binary	  either-­‐or	  construct,	  whereas	  in	  factit	   is	   a	   continuum	   from	   ultimate	   uncertainty	   to	   inevitable	   certainty.	   So,	   where	   thedividing	  line	  between	  foreseeable	  and	  unforeseeable	  lies?
 In	  the	  allocation	  of	  weather	  conditions	  risk,	  FIDIC	  uses	  a	  subjective	  test	  (“exceptionally
adverse	   climatic	   conditions”)	   whereas	   NEC	   uses	   an	   objective	   statistical	   test	   (weatherconditions	  which	  occur	  “average	   less	   frequently	  than	  once	   in	  ten	  years”).	  The	  judgmenton	  whether	  the	  conditions	  are	  "exceptional"	  is	  inherently	  subjective	  and	  hence	  leads	  todisputes	  on	  its	  interpretation.
 
One participant says that "experienced contractor" is a "hollowed out and meaningless
phrase". The elasticity of the phrase comes from fallacies such as the failure to assign
objective threshold of time-based experience or number-based experience of similar-projects
or similar-tasks, and the failure to distinguish between the experience of the organisation
itself, and the experience of its staff. Sometimes, new organisations hire staff with lengthy
experience in order to claim "expertise" but then form teams which suffer from low
or similar-tasks, and the failure to distinguish between the experience of the organisation
itself, and the experience of its staff. Sometimes, new organisations hire staff with lengthy
experience in order to claim "expertise" but then form teams which suffer from low
performance. On the other end of the scale, old construction companies with an extensive
past experience may be in a situation whereby most of its staff that implemented the past
similar projects left the company, and is left with juniors of minimal experience. Is there a
room to distinct between the organisational learning and individual learning? Further, does
the expertise of the project team or the expertise of organisation's head-office staff matter? It
is unknown. Therefore, the concept of "experienced contractor" is entirely uncertain in
meaning, and its interpretation will likely be a lottery that depends on the discretion of the
tribunal deciding the dispute. The participant suggests linking the concept to the
prequalification requirements in terms of detailed criteria covering financial and technical
strength, experience in similar projects, similar key activities, head office personnel and
project team etc.
Four respondents propose to use more specific terms and to attach objective values to the risk
events such as rainfall duration and intensity, wind speed, earthquake degree etc. Others
propose to provide illustration or commentary about such vague phrases, and to supplement
the contract with guidance on its interpretation.
 
 
4.2 Risk Allocation and Management
The respondents were asked if they think risk allocation clarity or fairness or both, would be
major causes of disputes, and then if they think FIDIC adopts fair and clear risk sharing
principles.
The interviewees disagree about the clarity (that is part of the clarity of the overall document)
and fairness of FIDIC risk sharing, and this disagreement is shared by engineers and
contractors.
Ten interviewees agree that disputes will arise if risk allocation is unclear. This is because
arguments will occur over who bears which risks. The parties will blame each other, and will
keep searching for ways to support their contractual position. This is simply because either
party will be unhappy to pay money. However, two people say that even if risk allocation is
clear, contractors continue to make claims. The clarity of the risk allocation, as part of the
clarity of the whole contract, is discussed in section 5.1 Clarity and Simplicity
On the other hand, the interviewees disagree about fairness and disputes. While eight
respondents say that if risk allocation is unfair and unrealistic, this will inevitably lead to
disputes, others argue that this affects bid price and not claims or disputes. Yet, some
participants maintain that fairness does not usually result in higher prices, as contractors
usually use zero overhead, because they are working in a very highly competitive market
with a desperate need to work. One interviewee refers to this situation as a prevailing "claim-
hunting culture" which means a contractor offers a price based only on the direct "dry" cost,
and then depends on claims to make profit. Obviously, such unjustified claims create
disputes. Therefore, it can be argued the unfair risk allocation creates disputes in an indirect
way (backdoor form of dispute creation).
Seven interviewees say that FIDIC is well-balanced, fair or relatively fair in that FIDIC views
parties as partners. They gave some examples such as force majeure and termination clauses,
clause 17 (Risk and Responsibility), and clause 18 (Insurance) that provide fair contracting
principles. Also, they believe that the claim procedure allows contractors to be compensated
fairly.
Five interviewees feel that FIDIC is or tends to be unfair because it shifts most of the risks to
contractors, except for a few things such as employer's risks and force majeure. Many of the
risks shifted towards contractors are illogical because they are weaker than clients to bear
certain risks. Hesitantly, they gave some examples such as the weather conditions risk clause
that gives an entitlement to only time compensation. They referred also to clauses that
provide for compensation only if the risky events are unforeseeable, but the de facto result is
that the Employer and the Engineer consider the risky events to be foreseeable and hence
contractors ultimately bear the risk of ground conditions, shortage in the availability of
materials and so on.
5.3 Force majeure and Prevention Events
Eight interviewees say that force majeure is one of the most dispute generating clauses
because of its lack of clarity. For instance, one interviewee states that it is unclear whether an
"insurrection" constitutes force majeure, and the parties kept arguing over this word for one
year! Also, after the tightening of the blockade on Gaza by Israel, there were many arguments
about whether this constitutes force majeure or not, as the outcome would cost certain
"insurrection" constitutes force majeure, and the parties kept arguing over this word for one
year! Also, after the tightening of the blockade on Gaza by Israel, there were many arguments
about whether this constitutes force majeure or not, as the outcome would cost certain
organisations a large amount of money.
Moreover, some local employers delete the provisions of force majeure. They argue that most
of the events that are included under this clause, such as war, hostilities, unrest etc. have
become normal things and circumstances in Gaza. Nevertheless, the authors believe that
deleting this clause just because a force majeure event has become normal or foreseeable is
illogical. This is because the main part of the definition of such an event is being out of the
control of either party even if it is foreseeable. Thus, allocating this risk to the contractor is a
default practice with devastating consequences on bid price or final project cost, and
definitely disputes, and may result in project failure.
Quite often, the contractor is the "victim" as he must bear the financial consequences of these
events, because employers have a strict and limited budget for each project. Employers try to
cooperate or share some aspects of these risks by granting an extension of time so that
contractors are not liable to pay liquidated damages.
4.4 Variations
The interviewees were asked if they think variations are a major source of disputes and why.
There was disagreement between the respondents about this issue. Some argue that variations
often lead to disputes, while others claim that variations very rarely cause disputes. Another
group stands in between and says disputes sometimes happen, particularly when a variation
order requires new prices or rates to be agreed. This disagreement between the interviewees
may be because of the different definition and perception of what constitutes a dispute.
Possibly, some consider that a rejection or disagreement about the first quotation is a dispute,
while others consider a dispute arises when disagreements occur after signing and agreeing
the variation price.
The common practice in Palestine is to agree the price of the varied work before commencing
the works. However, contractors sometimes start working before agreeing the price to avoid
delaying the project. Some people think that FIDIC is flexible in this way and does not oblige
pre-pricing or post-evaluation. Instead, FIDIC obliges the contractor to commence the work
even if the price of this work has not been agreed. It has been shown by the majority of
interviewees that disputes are usually avoided when they follow the pre-pricing route. One
contractor states that sometimes disputes arise even if a schedule of cost components and
analysis of the price breakdown structure are provided. The arguments arise over the value of
direct cost, and overhead percentage and so on. This conflict of interest is normal because
contractors consider a variation to be opportunity to make profit, while employers want to
adhere to the rates defined in the bill of quantities. All in all, this clearly indicates that the
NEC approach is much better than FIDIC’s approach to avoid disputes in the area of
variations.
It has been shown that disputes do not only arise from disagreement about evaluation of the
impact of the variation, but also from the definition of variation. In some cases, the engineer
instructs the contractor to do certain work, which falls outside the contract and thus
constitutes a variation in fact, but refuses to acknowledge that his order constitutes a
variation. While at other times, the contractor attempts to "make up" variations by delaying
the progress or sequence of works, or otherwise, which necessitates new work. Also,
contractors may argue that a normal instruction which does not constitute a variation, to be
variation.
4.5 The role of the Engineer vis-à-vis the Project Manager
The interviewees were asked whether they think the duality of the role of the Engineer (being
the client agent and, at the same time, the independent third party to determine matters fairly
between the employer and the contractor) is efficient or problematic and why. At the same
time, they were asked if they prefer the Engineer to be the adjudicator of the disputes
between the employer and the contractor and why.
Again, the respondents have different views about this matter. While three engineers defend
this role, two engineers, and all other respondents (employers and contractors) criticise this
role.
The proponents claim that the engineer knows "the nuts and bolts" of the project and contract
documents. They argue that if the role is divided into design, supervision, contract
administration and adjudication this will lead to inconsistency, misinterpretation of contract
documents, and may result in significant "rework" because each entity needs to understand
the work done by others. Furthermore, in case of dispute, they think the engineer is in a better
position to make the correct decision because he will interpret the contract documents
correctly and because of his day-to-day knowledge of the project progress and works.
the work done by others. Furthermore, in case of dispute, they think the engineer is in a better
position to make the correct decision because he will interpret the contract documents
correctly and because of his day-to-day knowledge of the project progress and works.
Four interviewees say that this role is not problematic in nature, but its efficiency depends on
the professionalism and expertise of the engineer. The engineer who is required to do all
these tasks must be very experienced to recognise, distinguish and split which tasks require
him to be agent, and which require him to be independent. Whether the engineer shall be the
adjudicator is a mere matter of experience and not basically about trust and honesty. This is
because experienced engineers consider it dishonourable and disreputable to make wrong or
biased decisions. One interviewee states that he prefers the engineer to be a member of the
DAB, but not the sole member.
The rest of respondents, five interviewees, argue, giving different reasons, that the role is
problematic, theoretical and not practical and combines conflicting roles. Engineers may
make things personal and do not understand their roles properly, what is required from them
and what their lines of authority and power, rights and obligations are. The interviewed
contractors told “horror stories” of the abusive and oppressive behaviour of some Engineers.
In their experience, this reaches its maximal limit when the Engineer (performing the
supervision, contract administration, and dispute resolution functions), is also the designer of
the works. This combination of roles is not uncommon in Palestine and it is next to
impossible for the Engineer to hold itself guilty and hence awards the contractor
compensation for the defective design, or inconsistent contract documents, or faulty
specifications from the pocket of his employer. It is just nonsense! An example for this, as
stated by an interviewed contractor, is that when the Engineer is aware of his contract
administration pitfalls, delayed decisions on approval requests, delayed responses on RFIs
etc. may award compensation for the contractor but on neutral grounds such as delays
because of weather conditions or events outside of the control of the project parties. The
interviewed contractors say that employers and engineers sometimes appear to change or
swap their roles, which clearly indicates they behave as one party. An interviewed employer
admits that in some cases the engineer becomes part of the problem, and then ironically the
Employer intervenes to settle the controversies between the Engineer and the contractor. In
addition, it is not unusual to find in construction contracts that the Engineer and the Employer
are the same origanisation. Therefore, it is against the natural justice to make a party the
judge in its own cause or in a case in which it has an interest.
The impartial role of the Engineer in performing the functions of certification, valuation and
dispute resolution has often been misunderstood or viewed with great scepticism by
practitioners in Palestine. The prevailing attitude is that engineers are the agents or the
representatives of employers, and in case of dispute, the engineer will not attempt to, or will
feel embarrassed to blame the person who pays him. Therefore, engineers tend to be
consciously or subconsciously biased and partial, and hence cannot be reliable and trusted
adjudicators. The prevailing adversarial culture between contractors and engineers in
Palestine, as the available literature suggests, is an imperative obstacle to the adjudicatory
role of engineers.
 
5 Conclusion
​ 
This study set out to assess the role of the standard form of contract, FIDIC or NEC in
particular, in dispute minimisation. The main results and findings suggest that both contracts
have commendable and desirable features for all parties. However, there are certain areas of
concern and sometimes limitations in both contracts.
NEC has probably many advantages over FIDIC particularly in clarity, risk management, and
variations. The authors argue that these advantages or benefits are for all parties to a
construction contract because disputes minimisation is a matter of mutual interest.
The position of the engineer/project manager has benefits and limitations in both contracts;
however, it seems the project manager role under NEC is more sensible in Palestine. This is
primarily because of the adversarial relationship and lack of trust between contractors and
engineers and the conflict of interests which makes it more reasonable to separate the
impartial and neutral role of dispute adjudication from the supervisory and contract
administration role in which the Engineer works as the client’s agent.
The force majeure or prevention provisions are inconclusive in both standard forms, a
challenge that arise from the inherently uncertain nature of these events.
On the other hand, FIDIC has the advantages of familiarity and precedence, widespread
popularity, and endorsement by many governments, development banks and institutions, and
major employers in Palestine and worldwide.
On the other hand, FIDIC has the advantages of familiarity and precedence, widespread
popularity, and endorsement by many governments, development banks and institutions, and
major employers in Palestine and worldwide.
In a nut shell, the standard form of contract can be a tool to “minimise” disputes, but certainly
not to eradicate them, and NEC appears to be more capable than FIDIC to do so. The
standard form of contract provides the regulatory regime for the parties’ relationships, roles
and responsibilities. The more fair and clear the regulations, the less room available for
disputes. Clarity necessitates a move from subjectivity to objectivity, from abstraction to
comprehensiveness, from generalisation to particularisation. This definitely helps in
shrinking the margin of contract’s incompleteness and uncertainties. Although the "theory of
contracts" is incapable to cope with the challenges of "uncertainty", risks are also
problematic. Risks are those events that may or may not occur. They can be assigned
probability values and hence undergo a probability test (NEC term) or a foreseeability test
(FIDIC term). Although NEC’s objective approach is a remarkable improvement compared to
FIDIC’s subjective approach, it is probably still vulnerable to different interpretations
The aforementioned discussions illustrate the boundaries and the extent of the contract
capability to tackle disputes. It is the opinion of the authors that the significant sources of
disputes are the users of the contracts and not the contracts themselves. Nevertheless, there is
no clear demarcation line between the shortcomings of the standard form of contract, and the
pitfalls of people. To give one example, the issue of clarity may be attributed to the contract's
drafting or to the user's lack of knowledge and experience to understand the contract. Such
arguments are expected to go on and on.
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